<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"><channel><title>Ransomware | FirewallSync</title><link>https://firewallsync.com/tags/ransomware/</link><description>Practical cybersecurity writing for engineering teams that ship fast.</description><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 04:45:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://firewallsync.com/tags/ransomware/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Maersk Cyberattack: Data Stolen From Acquired Legacy System</title><link>https://firewallsync.com/posts/maersk-cyberattack-legacy-system-data-theft-what-we-know/</link><guid>https://firewallsync.com/posts/maersk-cyberattack-legacy-system-data-theft-what-we-know/</guid><pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 04:45:00 +0000</pubDate><dc:creator>John Marshall</dc:creator><category>Security Operations</category><description>Maersk says attackers accessed and extracted data from a local legacy system inherited through an acquisition, that operations are unaffected and that its findings so far suggest no sensitive data was disclosed. A group calling itself WhiteArmor claims far more.</description><enclosure url="https://firewallsync.com/posts/maersk-cyberattack-legacy-system-data-theft-what-we-know/cover_hu2082571544012895419.jpg" type="image/jpeg" length="0"/><media:content url="https://firewallsync.com/posts/maersk-cyberattack-legacy-system-data-theft-what-we-know/cover_hu2082571544012895419.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" width="1200" height="630"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://firewallsync.com/posts/maersk-cyberattack-legacy-system-data-theft-what-we-know/cover_hu2082571544012895419.jpg" alt="Interior of a large warehouse: tall walls of grey storage bins on the left, orange racking stacked with cardboard boxes on the right and pallets in the aisle between" width="1200" height="630"></p><p>Maersk, the Danish shipping and logistics group, said on Wednesday, November 11, 2026 that it is investigating an IT security incident involving unauthorized access to, and data extraction from, one of its local legacy systems. The company says the system came from a previous acquisition, the incident is isolated to it, and its &ldquo;findings so far strongly suggest no sensitive data has been disclosed.&rdquo; It does not expect any effect on operations.</p>
<p>A group calling itself WhiteArmor claims much more, including plaintext driver passwords and a $5 million ransom demand. Maersk has not confirmed those claims. Below is what each side has said, and what engineering teams can check in their own estates.</p>
<h2 id="what-maersk-has-said">What Maersk has said</h2>
<p>Maersk&rsquo;s statement was reported by <a href="https://1027wbow.com/2026/11/11/shipping-firm-maersk-investigates-it-security-incident/">Reuters</a> and <a href="https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/11/11/shipping-giant-maersk-probes-it-security-incident-data-theft/5309096">The Register</a>, which says it was published on Maersk&rsquo;s news page. We could not retrieve the notice itself; the quotes below are as those outlets reported them. According to the statement:</p>
<ul>
<li>The incident involves unauthorized access and data extraction from one local legacy system, described as a system &ldquo;from a previous acquisition.&rdquo;</li>
<li>Maersk started an investigation and secured the affected system.</li>
<li>&ldquo;Our findings so far strongly suggest no sensitive data has been disclosed.&rdquo;</li>
<li>The incident &ldquo;is isolated to a local system,&rdquo; with no indication of impact on other Maersk systems or on customer and partner systems connected through integrations such as APIs and EDI.</li>
<li>Maersk does not expect operations to be affected; customers can keep booking and managing shipments as usual.</li>
<li>It asks people to treat unexpected communications claiming to relate to the incident with caution and to verify them through their usual Maersk contact.</li>
</ul>
<p>Maersk has not said when the intrusion happened, how it was detected, how the attackers got in, which system was affected or what data was taken.</p>
<h2 id="confirmed-vs-claimed">Confirmed vs claimed</h2>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Item</th>
          <th>Status</th>
          <th>Source</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td>Unauthorized access and data extraction from one local legacy system</td>
          <td>Confirmed by Maersk</td>
          <td>Reuters, The Register</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>System came from a previous acquisition</td>
          <td>Confirmed by Maersk</td>
          <td>The Register</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>No indication of impact on other Maersk, customer or partner systems</td>
          <td>Maersk&rsquo;s statement</td>
          <td>Reuters, The Register</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>No expected effect on operations</td>
          <td>Maersk&rsquo;s statement</td>
          <td>Reuters, The Register</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>&ldquo;No sensitive data has been disclosed&rdquo;</td>
          <td>Maersk&rsquo;s preliminary finding (&ldquo;so far&rdquo;)</td>
          <td>The Register</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Affected system is the LF Logistics platform</td>
          <td><strong>Not confirmed</strong>; Maersk has not named the system</td>
          <td>Security Affairs, Cybernews</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>About 100 GB stolen, incl. driver records and plaintext passwords</td>
          <td><strong>Claimed by WhiteArmor</strong></td>
          <td>Security Affairs</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>$5 million ransom in bitcoin, 30-day deadline</td>
          <td><strong>Claimed by WhiteArmor</strong></td>
          <td>Security Affairs</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>WhiteArmor is responsible</td>
          <td><strong>Not confirmed</strong> by Maersk</td>
          <td>Security Affairs, Cybernews</td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="what-is-not-confirmed">What is not confirmed</h2>
<p>The claims come from the group&rsquo;s leak-site listing as described by <a href="https://securityaffairs.com/202869/data-breach/whitearmor-demands-5-million-from-maersk-claims-theft-of-100gb-of-data.html">Security Affairs</a> and <a href="https://cybernews.com/security/maersk-confirms-cyberattack-ransomware/">Cybernews</a>. We have not viewed the leak site and do not link to it.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Data volume and types.</strong> Security Affairs reports that the group claims about 100 GB from the &ldquo;OCF/LF Logistics platform&rdquo;, including &ldquo;nearly 30,000 driver records, plaintext passwords, 33 super admin accounts&rdquo;, signed delivery receipts, inventory records, purchase orders, advance shipping notices and 27,842 mobile device logs. Cybernews reports a claim of more than 16,000 plaintext driver passwords. The two reports give different figures, and neither is verified.</li>
<li><strong>The LF Logistics link.</strong> Both outlets note that Maersk bought LF Logistics in 2022 and that this could fit the &ldquo;previous acquisition&rdquo; wording. Security Affairs states that &ldquo;the company has not confirmed this connection.&rdquo;</li>
<li><strong>The ransom.</strong> Security Affairs reports a $5 million demand in bitcoin with 30 days to pay. This is the group&rsquo;s claim.</li>
<li><strong>The name.</strong> Security Affairs spells the group &ldquo;WhiteArmor&rdquo;; Cybernews uses &ldquo;WhiteArmour&rdquo;.</li>
</ul>
<p>If Maersk&rsquo;s investigation changes any of this, we will add a dated update at the top of this article.</p>
<h2 id="why-the-legacy-system-from-an-acquisition-detail-matters">Why the &ldquo;legacy system from an acquisition&rdquo; detail matters</h2>
<p>Maersk&rsquo;s own description is the useful part for engineers. Acquired platforms tend to arrive with their own identity store, admin accounts, password storage, logging and partner integrations, and they keep running until a migration finishes. Maersk says the affected system was isolated and that it sees no impact on systems connected through APIs and EDI; the open question for any company in the same position is whether that isolation was designed or simply the result of the system never being fully integrated.</p>
<p>For context: Maersk is no stranger to large incidents. In 2017 the NotPetya wiper took down its IT; The Register recalls that Maersk said at the time it expected a bill of around $300 million. Nothing reported links the two events, and the 2026 incident, as Maersk describes it, is far narrower.</p>
<h2 id="what-to-check-in-your-own-environment">What to check in your own environment</h2>
<p>These follow from the confirmed facts (an acquired legacy system, data extraction, partner integrations, phishing risk) and are not a reconstruction of the Maersk attack, whose method has not been disclosed.</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Inventory acquired systems as their own estate.</strong> List every platform that came with an acquisition, who owns it today, whether it has its own internet exposure, and its retirement date. Systems without a named owner rarely get patched.</li>
<li><strong>Check how they store passwords.</strong> If an inherited application stores driver, supplier or customer passwords reversibly or in plaintext, that is the first thing to fix. Our <a href="/posts/password-hashing-argon2id-vs-bcrypt-vs-scrypt-which-to-use-and-with-what-parameters/">Argon2id vs bcrypt vs scrypt guide</a> covers what to migrate to and how to rehash on next login.</li>
<li><strong>Review super-admin accounts.</strong> Count administrative accounts on inherited platforms, remove unused ones and put the rest behind your central identity provider with MFA.</li>
<li><strong>Map and scope the integrations.</strong> For each API and EDI connection between the legacy system and the rest of the business, record the credentials it uses, what they can reach and when they were last rotated. Rotate them after any suspected compromise, even if the vendor says there is no indication of impact.</li>
<li><strong>Prepare for follow-on phishing.</strong> Maersk&rsquo;s warning about unexpected communications applies to anyone whose contact details may be in stolen logistics data. Our <a href="/posts/vetting-third-party-saas-tools-before-they-touch-your-data/">third-party SaaS vetting guide</a> covers questions to ask suppliers about how they hold your data.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="sources-and-verification">Sources and verification</h2>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Important claim</th>
          <th>Source</th>
          <th>Status</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td>Maersk statement: unauthorized access and data extraction, local legacy system, no expected operational impact</td>
          <td><a href="https://1027wbow.com/2026/11/11/shipping-firm-maersk-investigates-it-security-incident/">Reuters via 102.7 WBOW</a></td>
          <td>Verified (two outlets)</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Statement quotes; system &ldquo;from a previous acquisition&rdquo;; API/EDI wording; phishing caution; NotPetya $300M context</td>
          <td><a href="https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/11/11/shipping-giant-maersk-probes-it-security-incident-data-theft/5309096">The Register</a></td>
          <td>Verified (Maersk notice not retrieved directly)</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>WhiteArmor claims: ~100 GB, data types, $5M, 30 days; Maersk has not confirmed LF Logistics link</td>
          <td><a href="https://securityaffairs.com/202869/data-breach/whitearmor-demands-5-million-from-maersk-claims-theft-of-100gb-of-data.html">Security Affairs</a></td>
          <td>Qualified (claims, unverified)</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Claim of 16,000+ plaintext driver passwords; LF Logistics acquired 2022</td>
          <td><a href="https://cybernews.com/security/maersk-confirms-cyberattack-ransomware/">Cybernews</a></td>
          <td>Qualified (claims, unverified)</td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>Vanderbilt BYOD Ransomware Attack: What We Know So Far</title><link>https://firewallsync.com/posts/vanderbilt-university-byod-ransomware-attack-what-we-know/</link><guid>https://firewallsync.com/posts/vanderbilt-university-byod-ransomware-attack-what-we-know/</guid><pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 04:51:00 +0000</pubDate><dc:creator>John Marshall</dc:creator><category>Security Operations</category><description>Vanderbilt University told students and staff on November 9 to shut down their devices and get off campus Wi-Fi while it contained a cybersecurity incident. A new ransomware group called BYOD claims it stole over a million SSNs, and it has hit Michigan State and UNM Health in the last month. What is confirmed, what is only claimed, and what engineers can take from the three incidents.</description><enclosure url="https://firewallsync.com/posts/vanderbilt-university-byod-ransomware-attack-what-we-know/cover_hu4013828990412037190.jpg" type="image/jpeg" length="0"/><media:content url="https://firewallsync.com/posts/vanderbilt-university-byod-ransomware-attack-what-we-know/cover_hu4013828990412037190.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" width="1200" height="630"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://firewallsync.com/posts/vanderbilt-university-byod-ransomware-attack-what-we-know/cover_hu4013828990412037190.jpg" alt="A long, empty lecture hall with rows of wooden and black seats behind white desks, tall windows on the right and ceiling lights overhead" width="1200" height="630"></p><p><em>Reported as of November 10, 2026, 05:00 UTC. Vanderbilt said it would give its next update by 9 a.m. Central on November 10. We will add dated updates here if confirmed facts change.</em></p>
<p>On Monday, November 9, Vanderbilt University told students and employees to <strong>shut down university devices and disconnect from campus Wi-Fi</strong> while its IT team worked to contain a cybersecurity incident, <a href="https://fox17.com/news/local/vanderbilt-cybersecurity-incident-disrupts-classes-as-alleged-hackers-claim-stolen-data">FOX 17 reported</a>. A new ransomware group called <strong>BYOD</strong> has claimed the attack and says it stole data on more than a million people. Vanderbilt has not confirmed any data theft.</p>
<p>Vanderbilt is the third US university system BYOD has claimed in about a month, after Michigan State University and the University of New Mexico&rsquo;s health system. Below: what each institution has confirmed, what is only the group&rsquo;s claim, and what engineering and IT teams can take from it.</p>
<h2 id="timeline">Timeline</h2>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Date</th>
          <th>Event</th>
          <th>Source</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td>Early Oct 2026</td>
          <td>Michigan State University (MSU) &ldquo;became aware of suspicious cyber activity&rdquo;; anyone with an MSU NetID was told to reset their password to at least 15 characters</td>
          <td><a href="https://therecord.media/michigan-state-university-byod-gang-cyber-incident">The Record</a></td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Mon, Oct 26</td>
          <td>UNM Health limited new admissions, diverted ambulances and suspended outpatient surgeries and appointments</td>
          <td><a href="https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/unm-health-ransomware-attack-disrupts-patient-care-surgeries">BleepingComputer</a></td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Tue, Oct 27</td>
          <td>UNM said its hospitals remained open; classes at its four health sciences schools were canceled</td>
          <td>BleepingComputer</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Sun, Nov 1 (approx.)</td>
          <td>BYOD added MSU to its leak site, claiming data on 1.3 million current and former students</td>
          <td>The Record (Nov 2)</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Mon, Nov 9, morning</td>
          <td>Vanderbilt told staff and students to shut down devices and leave campus Wi-Fi</td>
          <td>FOX 17, <a href="https://gizmodo.com/attackers-claim-to-have-stolen-data-on-over-1-million-vanderbilt-students-and-staff-2000837388">Gizmodo</a></td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Mon, Nov 9, 7 p.m.</td>
          <td>Vanderbilt update: Wi-Fi restored, most systems still restricted, normal schedule on Nov 10</td>
          <td>FOX 17 (quoting the update)</td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="what-vanderbilt-has-said">What Vanderbilt has said</h2>
<p>Vanderbilt&rsquo;s 7 p.m. update on November 9, as quoted by FOX 17:</p>
<ul>
<li>&ldquo;Campus Wi-Fi is now available, but access to most Vanderbilt systems and applications remains restricted.&rdquo;</li>
<li>&ldquo;Vanderbilt Information Technology is working with government agencies and other partners to manage this situation.&rdquo;</li>
<li>&ldquo;Classes will proceed on a normal schedule.&rdquo;</li>
</ul>
<p>Earlier on Monday, officials told users to &ldquo;SHUT DOWN YOUR DEVICE IMMEDIATELY to help prevent potential further security risks&rdquo; and not to &ldquo;investigate, troubleshoot, or resolve the issue yourself&rdquo;, according to Gizmodo. FOX 17 reports that the university also told people to watch for unexpected pop-ups, unfamiliar apps, password or sign-in requests, and missing or renamed files, including in OneDrive and Box, and to contact IT by phone or from a separate device.</p>
<p>FOX 17 reports that students were told to stay off Brightspace, the coursework platform, and that some instructors moved to printed materials. Vanderbilt Health, which operates separately, told FOX 17 its IT systems were unaffected and patient care continued.</p>
<h2 id="confirmed-vs-claimed">Confirmed vs claimed</h2>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Item</th>
          <th>Status</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td>Vanderbilt is responding to a cybersecurity incident and restricted most systems</td>
          <td><strong>Confirmed</strong> by Vanderbilt&rsquo;s own updates (as quoted by FOX 17 and Gizmodo)</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Vanderbilt is working with government agencies</td>
          <td><strong>Confirmed</strong> by Vanderbilt&rsquo;s update</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>BYOD is responsible</td>
          <td><strong>Claimed</strong> by BYOD; Vanderbilt has not named an attacker</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>&ldquo;Over 1 Million SSNs, Full Names, Email addresses, Phone Numbers, Student &amp; Employee Records&rdquo; stolen</td>
          <td><strong>Claimed</strong> in BYOD&rsquo;s ransom message (quoted by Gizmodo); not confirmed by Vanderbilt</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Databases locked and part of the network taken over</td>
          <td><strong>Claimed</strong> by BYOD (per FOX 17); not confirmed</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>Ransom amount</td>
          <td><strong>Not reported</strong>. The group&rsquo;s message says it will act &ldquo;when communication has been established between our team and yours&rdquo;</td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<h2 id="what-is-not-confirmed">What is not confirmed</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>How BYOD got in.</strong> None of the reports we checked say how the attackers gained access at Vanderbilt, MSU or UNM. Gizmodo notes the group&rsquo;s name refers to &ldquo;Bring Your Own Device&rdquo; policies but does not connect it to how this breach happened, and we have seen nothing that does.</li>
<li><strong>Reports of on-screen warnings.</strong> FOX 17 cites reports of audio warnings and unfamiliar pop-ups on university computers but says it did not verify them.</li>
<li><strong>Other victims.</strong> Gizmodo&rsquo;s update cites DataBreach.com for a further BYOD claim against a Texas state agency. We have not confirmed it and leave it out of the timeline.</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="the-pattern-big-claims-narrower-confirmations">The pattern: big claims, narrower confirmations</h2>
<p>The two earlier incidents show the gap between what BYOD posts and what victims confirm:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Michigan State:</strong> BYOD claims data on 1.3 million people. MSU told The Record that the activity &ldquo;appeared to be a potential credential compromise event&rdquo;, that &ldquo;current evidence does not indicate a successful compromise of the university&rsquo;s central Active Directory environment,&rdquo; and that there was &ldquo;no evidence that other MSU data was accessed, changed, or stolen.&rdquo;</li>
<li><strong>UNM Health:</strong> BYOD claimed it compromised 36,000 systems, including Active Directory, Group Policy and the Microsoft Entra tenant. UNM&rsquo;s assessment, as reported by BleepingComputer, found the event &ldquo;did not penetrate core systems or servers&rdquo; and affected some end-user devices. UNM still diverted ambulances while it worked that out.</li>
</ul>
<p>BYOD also told UNM it would provide free decryption keys for healthcare facilities and offered up to $2,500 per affected patient, according to BleepingComputer. The Record describes the group as new, emerging in September, with little known about it.</p>
<p>We can&rsquo;t say which side is closer to the truth at Vanderbilt yet. The point for defenders is that both numbers matter: the confirmed scope drives recovery, and the claimed scope drives notification pressure and press coverage.</p>
<h2 id="what-engineers-and-it-teams-can-take-from-this">What engineers and IT teams can take from this</h2>
<ol>
<li><strong>Pre-write the &ldquo;shut it all down&rdquo; order.</strong> Vanderbilt&rsquo;s instruction to power off devices and leave Wi-Fi is a blunt but fast containment step. Decide in advance who can issue it, which systems are exempt (clinical, safety, research instruments), and how you will reach people once email and SSO are off. Run it in a <a href="/posts/the-tabletop-exercise-gap-testing-incident-response-for-real/">tabletop exercise</a> before you need it.</li>
<li><strong>Keep an out-of-band help channel.</strong> Vanderbilt told users to contact IT by phone or from a separate device. If your helpdesk portal sits behind the same identity provider as everything else, it goes down with it.</li>
<li><strong>Watch synced storage.</strong> Vanderbilt&rsquo;s warning about missing or renamed files in OneDrive and Box is a reminder that sync clients can spread encrypted or renamed files into the cloud. Know your version-history and restore limits, and alert on mass rename or delete activity.</li>
<li><strong>Make a password reset cheap to run.</strong> MSU&rsquo;s response to a suspected credential compromise was a campus-wide NetID reset. Practise it, and make sure your <a href="/posts/logging-for-incidents-not-for-dashboards/">logs answer incident questions</a>, such as which accounts authenticated from where, before you need them.</li>
<li><strong>Patch what ransomware crews are known to use.</strong> How BYOD got in is unknown, but CISA flags KEV entries tied to ransomware campaigns, and that flag changes over time. See our analysis of <a href="/posts/kev-knownransomwarecampaignuse-unknown-to-known-flips/">KEV knownRansomwareCampaignUse flips</a>.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="sources">Sources</h2>
<ul>
<li>FOX 17 (WZTV), &ldquo;Vanderbilt cybersecurity incident disrupts classes as alleged hackers claim stolen data,&rdquo; November 9, 2026: <a href="https://fox17.com/news/local/vanderbilt-cybersecurity-incident-disrupts-classes-as-alleged-hackers-claim-stolen-data">fox17.com</a></li>
<li>Gizmodo, &ldquo;Attackers Claim to Have Stolen Data on Over 1 Million Vanderbilt Students and Staff,&rdquo; November 9, 2026: <a href="https://gizmodo.com/attackers-claim-to-have-stolen-data-on-over-1-million-vanderbilt-students-and-staff-2000837388">gizmodo.com</a></li>
<li>The Record, Michigan State University and the BYOD gang, November 2, 2026: <a href="https://therecord.media/michigan-state-university-byod-gang-cyber-incident">therecord.media</a></li>
<li>BleepingComputer, &ldquo;UNM Health ransomware attack disrupts patient care, surgeries,&rdquo; October 27, 2026: <a href="https://bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/unm-health-ransomware-attack-disrupts-patient-care-surgeries">bleepingcomputer.com</a></li>
</ul>
<p>We could not retrieve Vanderbilt&rsquo;s own update page directly during this run. Vanderbilt&rsquo;s statements above are as quoted by FOX 17 and Gizmodo.</p>
]]></content:encoded></item><item><title>KEV knownRansomwareCampaignUse: 114 Unknown-to-Known Flips</title><link>https://firewallsync.com/posts/kev-knownransomwarecampaignuse-unknown-to-known-flips/</link><guid>https://firewallsync.com/posts/kev-knownransomwarecampaignuse-unknown-to-known-flips/</guid><pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 04:50:00 +0000</pubDate><dc:creator>Craig Leslie</dc:creator><category>Security Operations</category><description>CISA's KEV catalog marks each entry's ransomware use as Known or Unknown, and it changes that field without an announcement. We replayed every kev-data commit since January 2025: 114 entries flipped from Unknown to Known, none flipped back, and 25 of the 27 Known entries added in 2026 started as Unknown. Here is how often it happens, how long it takes, and a tested script to catch the next flip.</description><enclosure url="https://firewallsync.com/posts/kev-knownransomwarecampaignuse-unknown-to-known-flips/cover_hu14181278352977741825.jpg" type="image/jpeg" length="0"/><media:content url="https://firewallsync.com/posts/kev-knownransomwarecampaignuse-unknown-to-known-flips/cover_hu14181278352977741825.jpg" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" width="1200" height="630"/><content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="https://firewallsync.com/posts/kev-knownransomwarecampaignuse-unknown-to-known-flips/cover_hu14181278352977741825.jpg" alt="Beside a large yellow circular panel, a grey industrial control panel with a round ALARM indicator, a RESET button, a key switch and a column of small indicator lamps, one of them lit red" width="1200" height="630"></p><p>CISA&rsquo;s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog tags every entry with <code>knownRansomwareCampaignUse</code>: <code>Known</code> or <code>Unknown</code>. That value is not fixed at listing. Replaying the public <a href="https://github.com/cisagov/kev-data">kev-data</a> Git history from January 27, 2025 to November 10, 2026, we found <strong>114 entries that changed from <code>Unknown</code> to <code>Known</code></strong>, and none that went the other way. Of the 27 entries added in 2026 that are now marked <code>Known</code>, <strong>25 were listed as <code>Unknown</code> first</strong>.</p>
<p>A flip leaves <code>dateAdded</code> and <code>dueDate</code> untouched, so a pipeline that only watches for new CVE IDs will never notice. If your process gives ransomware-linked KEV entries a shorter SLA, you need to diff this field between catalog versions. This article shows how often it changes, how long it takes, and a tested script that catches it. For where KEV sits in the wider triage flow, see our <a href="/posts/vulnerability-prioritization-workflow-cve-record-to-patch-ticket/">vulnerability prioritization workflow from CVE record to ticket</a>.</p>
<h2 id="what-the-field-means">What the field means</h2>
<p>The KEV JSON schema in kev-data defines the field like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>&ldquo;&lsquo;Known&rsquo; if this vulnerability is known to have been leveraged as part of a ransomware campaign; &lsquo;Unknown&rsquo; if CISA lacks confirmation that the vulnerability has been utilized for ransomware&rdquo;</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Two consequences follow:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong><code>Unknown</code> is not &ldquo;no&rdquo;.</strong> It means CISA has not confirmed ransomware use. Don&rsquo;t treat it as a negative signal or a reason to slow down.</li>
<li><strong><code>Known</code> is a one-way upgrade in practice.</strong> In the window we measured, no entry went from <code>Known</code> back to <code>Unknown</code>.</li>
</ul>
<p>The field sits alongside <code>dateAdded</code>, <code>dueDate</code>, <code>requiredAction</code> and the rest. Our <a href="/posts/cisa-kev-json-feed-what-each-field-means-and-how-to-match-it-against-a-scanner-export/">field guide to the KEV JSON feed</a> covers each of them.</p>
<h2 id="how-we-measured">How we measured</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>Data:</strong> every commit to <code>known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json</code> in <a href="https://github.com/cisagov/kev-data">cisagov/kev-data</a>, from the first commit (2025-01-27) to the commit for catalog version 2026.11.09 (pushed 2026-11-10 03:13 UTC). That&rsquo;s 341 commits. One commit, from 2025-02-25, did not parse as JSON and was skipped; any change in it shows up in the next commit.</li>
<li><strong>Flip:</strong> a <code>cveID</code> whose <code>knownRansomwareCampaignUse</code> value differs from its value in the previous parsed commit.</li>
<li><strong>Flip date:</strong> the Git commit timestamp. It records when the change reached the repository, not when CISA&rsquo;s analysts decided it, so treat it as an upper bound with day-level precision.</li>
<li><strong>Lag:</strong> flip date minus the entry&rsquo;s <code>dateAdded</code>, in whole days.</li>
</ul>
<p>The repository only starts in January 2025, so flips before that date are invisible here. The 1,252 entries in the first commit form the baseline: 245 were already <code>Known</code>.</p>
<h2 id="how-often-the-flag-flips">How often the flag flips</h2>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Period</th>
          <th>Unknown → Known</th>
          <th>Known → Unknown</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td>2025 (from Jan 27)</td>
          <td>59</td>
          <td>0</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>2026 (to Nov 10)</td>
          <td>55</td>
          <td>0</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td><strong>Total</strong></td>
          <td><strong>114</strong></td>
          <td><strong>0</strong></td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<p>The 2025 total matches the 59 flips GreyNoise&rsquo;s Glenn Thorpe counted for 2025, as <a href="https://www.theregister.com/2026/02/03/greynoise_cisa_ransomware_gripe/">reported by The Register</a> in February 2026. Thorpe described the change as &ldquo;no alert, no announcement&rdquo; and &ldquo;Just a field change in a JSON file&rdquo;. Our count comes from an independent replay of the same public history.</p>
<p>Flips come in batches rather than a steady trickle. The largest single days were 2025-05-12 (14 flips) and 2026-08-14 (10). The most recent flip in the data was CVE-2026-63077 (JetBrains TeamCity) on 2026-09-23, 48 days before this article. A quiet spell is normal and does not mean the field has stopped changing.</p>
<p>By vendor, Microsoft accounts for 33 of the 114 flips, followed by Ivanti (6), Fortinet (5), SonicWall (5) and Oracle (5).</p>
<h2 id="new-entries-almost-always-start-as-unknown">New entries almost always start as Unknown</h2>
<p>Of the 524 entries that first appeared in the catalog during the window, <strong>521 were listed as <code>Unknown</code></strong> and only 3 as <code>Known</code>. Ransomware attribution usually arrives after exploitation evidence, so the first version of an entry rarely carries it.</p>
<p>For the 50 entries that were both added and flipped inside the window:</p>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Lag from dateAdded to flip</th>
          <th>Entries</th>
          <th>Cumulative</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td>7 days or less</td>
          <td>17</td>
          <td>17</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>8–30 days</td>
          <td>12</td>
          <td>29</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>31–90 days</td>
          <td>10</td>
          <td>39</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>More than 90 days</td>
          <td>11</td>
          <td>50</td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
<p>The median lag is 20 days and the longest is 554 days. One entry, CVE-2025-61882 (Oracle E-Business Suite), shows a lag of −1: it appeared in the repository on 2025-10-06 with a <code>dateAdded</code> of 2025-10-07 and flipped the same day.</p>
<p>Seen from the other side: of the 289 entries in the current catalog with a 2026 <code>dateAdded</code>, 27 are <code>Known</code>, and 25 of those got there through a flip. If you only read the field once, at listing, you would have missed almost all of this year&rsquo;s ransomware signal.</p>
<h2 id="old-entries-flip-too">Old entries flip too</h2>
<p>64 of the 114 flips were on entries that were already in the catalog when the repository started. Across all 114, the median lag is <strong>352 days</strong>, and the longest are CVE-2016-7255 and CVE-2019-0859 (both Microsoft Win32k, added 2021-11-03), which flipped on 2026-09-09, 1,771 days later.</p>
<p>For triage, this means an entry you closed or risk-accepted years ago can pick up a ransomware link today. That&rsquo;s a reason to reopen it, especially on systems that never got the fix. The same logic applies to KEV backfills of old CVEs, covered in our <a href="/posts/kev-time-to-listing-cve-published-to-dateadded-days-by-vendor/">KEV time-to-listing analysis</a>.</p>
<h2 id="detect-flips-between-two-catalog-versions">Detect flips between two catalog versions</h2>
<p>The script below compares two KEV JSON snapshots and prints every entry whose <code>knownRansomwareCampaignUse</code> changed. It uses only the Python standard library. We ran it with Python 3 on the kev-data snapshots for catalog versions 2026.08.11 and 2026.08.14. The output (abbreviated) matches the 2026-08-14 batch in the full replay:</p>
<div class="highlight"><pre tabindex="0" style="color:#f8f8f2;background-color:#272822;-moz-tab-size:4;-o-tab-size:4;tab-size:4;"><code class="language-python" data-lang="python"><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#75715e">#!/usr/bin/env python3</span>
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;&#34;&#34;Report KEV entries whose knownRansomwareCampaignUse changed between two snapshots.
</span></span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#e6db74">Usage: python3 kev_ransomware_flips.py OLD.json NEW.json
</span></span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;&#34;&#34;</span>
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#f92672">import</span> json<span style="color:#f92672">,</span> sys
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#66d9ef">def</span> <span style="color:#a6e22e">load</span>(path):
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>    <span style="color:#66d9ef">with</span> open(path) <span style="color:#66d9ef">as</span> f:
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>        doc <span style="color:#f92672">=</span> json<span style="color:#f92672">.</span>load(f)
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>    <span style="color:#66d9ef">return</span> doc[<span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;catalogVersion&#34;</span>], {v[<span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;cveID&#34;</span>]: v <span style="color:#66d9ef">for</span> v <span style="color:#f92672">in</span> doc[<span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;vulnerabilities&#34;</span>]}
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>old_ver, old <span style="color:#f92672">=</span> load(sys<span style="color:#f92672">.</span>argv[<span style="color:#ae81ff">1</span>])
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>new_ver, new <span style="color:#f92672">=</span> load(sys<span style="color:#f92672">.</span>argv[<span style="color:#ae81ff">2</span>])
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>print(<span style="color:#e6db74">f</span><span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;# </span><span style="color:#e6db74">{</span>old_ver<span style="color:#e6db74">}</span><span style="color:#e6db74"> -&gt; </span><span style="color:#e6db74">{</span>new_ver<span style="color:#e6db74">}</span><span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;</span>)
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#66d9ef">for</span> cve, v <span style="color:#f92672">in</span> sorted(new<span style="color:#f92672">.</span>items()):
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>    before <span style="color:#f92672">=</span> old<span style="color:#f92672">.</span>get(cve, {})<span style="color:#f92672">.</span>get(<span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;knownRansomwareCampaignUse&#34;</span>)
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>    after <span style="color:#f92672">=</span> v[<span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;knownRansomwareCampaignUse&#34;</span>]
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>    <span style="color:#66d9ef">if</span> before <span style="color:#f92672">is</span> <span style="color:#f92672">not</span> <span style="color:#66d9ef">None</span> <span style="color:#f92672">and</span> before <span style="color:#f92672">!=</span> after:
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>        print(<span style="color:#e6db74">f</span><span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;</span><span style="color:#e6db74">{</span>cve<span style="color:#e6db74">}</span><span style="color:#ae81ff">\t</span><span style="color:#e6db74">{</span>before<span style="color:#e6db74">}</span><span style="color:#e6db74"> -&gt; </span><span style="color:#e6db74">{</span>after<span style="color:#e6db74">}</span><span style="color:#ae81ff">\t</span><span style="color:#e6db74">added </span><span style="color:#e6db74">{</span>v[<span style="color:#e6db74">&#39;dateAdded&#39;</span>]<span style="color:#e6db74">}</span><span style="color:#ae81ff">\t</span><span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;</span>
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>              <span style="color:#e6db74">f</span><span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;</span><span style="color:#e6db74">{</span>v[<span style="color:#e6db74">&#39;vendorProject&#39;</span>]<span style="color:#f92672">.</span>strip()<span style="color:#e6db74">}</span><span style="color:#e6db74"> </span><span style="color:#e6db74">{</span>v[<span style="color:#e6db74">&#39;product&#39;</span>]<span style="color:#f92672">.</span>strip()<span style="color:#e6db74">}</span><span style="color:#e6db74">&#34;</span>)
</span></span></code></pre></div><div class="highlight"><pre tabindex="0" style="color:#f8f8f2;background-color:#272822;-moz-tab-size:4;-o-tab-size:4;tab-size:4;"><code class="language-text" data-lang="text"><span style="display:flex;"><span># 2026.08.11 -&gt; 2026.08.14
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>CVE-2016-0189	Unknown -&gt; Known	added 2022-03-28	Microsoft Internet Explorer
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>CVE-2018-0802	Unknown -&gt; Known	added 2021-11-03	Microsoft Office
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>CVE-2019-5591	Unknown -&gt; Known	added 2021-11-03	Fortinet FortiOS
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>CVE-2021-4034	Unknown -&gt; Known	added 2022-06-27	Red Hat Polkit
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>CVE-2025-60710	Unknown -&gt; Known	added 2026-04-13	Microsoft Windows
</span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span>...
</span></span></code></pre></div><p>To run it in production, keep the last catalog you processed, and when a new <code>catalogVersion</code> arrives, run the diff before you overwrite the old file. To backfill history, clone kev-data and feed consecutive commits to the same function (<code>git log --reverse --format=%H -- known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json</code> lists them; <code>git show &lt;commit&gt;:known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json</code> extracts each one).</p>
<p>The script skips entries that are new in the second snapshot, because their listing value is not a change. Handle new entries in your normal KEV ingest.</p>
<h2 id="what-to-do-with-a-flip">What to do with a flip</h2>
<ol>
<li><strong>Treat Unknown → Known as a new event.</strong> Open or re-prioritize tickets for every asset that still carries the CVE, even if the KEV due date has already passed or the finding was risk-accepted.</li>
<li><strong>Don&rsquo;t read Unknown as low risk.</strong> Of this year&rsquo;s <code>Known</code> entries, 25 of 27 started as <code>Unknown</code>. A ransomware-only fast lane that ignores everything else will lag the data by weeks.</li>
<li><strong>Record the flip date yourself.</strong> The catalog keeps no history of the field, so your ticket or data store is the only place that will remember when the link appeared.</li>
<li><strong>Combine it with other signals, don&rsquo;t substitute it for them.</strong> EPSS scores for newly listed KEV CVEs often start low (see our <a href="/posts/epss-scores-for-kev-cves-low-after-listing-threshold-audit/">analysis of EPSS for KEV entries</a>), so a flip is a useful second trigger rather than the only one.</li>
</ol>
<h2 id="limits-of-this-article">Limits of this article</h2>
<ul>
<li>The data covers January 27, 2025 to November 10, 2026. Earlier flips are not visible in the kev-data repository.</li>
<li>Flip dates are Git commit times, not CISA decision times.</li>
<li>CISA does not publish the evidence behind a <code>Known</code> value, so this article measures when the label changed, not why.</li>
<li>One entry that flipped, CVE-2025-6264 (Rapid7 Velociraptor), has since been removed from the catalog. It is counted in the 114 but not in the 361 current <code>Known</code> entries.</li>
</ul>
<h2 id="sources-and-verification">Sources and verification</h2>
<table>
  <thead>
      <tr>
          <th>Important claim</th>
          <th>Source</th>
          <th>Status</th>
      </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
      <tr>
          <td>Definition of Known and Unknown</td>
          <td><a href="https://github.com/cisagov/kev-data/blob/develop/known_exploited_vulnerabilities_schema.json">KEV JSON schema, cisagov/kev-data</a></td>
          <td>Verified</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>114 Unknown → Known flips, 0 reversals; lag and vendor figures</td>
          <td>Replay of <a href="https://github.com/cisagov/kev-data">cisagov/kev-data</a> commit history, 2025-01-27 to 2026-11-10</td>
          <td>Verified (our computation)</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>361 of 1,773 entries Known (20.4%)</td>
          <td><a href="https://github.com/cisagov/kev-data">KEV JSON</a>, catalogVersion 2026.11.09</td>
          <td>Verified</td>
      </tr>
      <tr>
          <td>GreyNoise counted 59 flips in 2025; &ldquo;no alert, no announcement&rdquo;</td>
          <td><a href="https://www.theregister.com/2026/02/03/greynoise_cisa_ransomware_gripe/">The Register, Feb 3, 2026</a></td>
          <td>Qualified (press report of third-party research; matches our count)</td>
      </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>
]]></content:encoded></item></channel></rss>